Abstract: Sartre's concept of 'non-thetic awareness' must be understood as equivalent to the concept of 'nonconceptual content' currently discussed in anglophone epistemology and philosophy of mind, since it could not otherwise play the role in the structure of 'bad faith', or self-deception, that Sartre ascribes to it. This understanding of the term makes sense of some otherwise puzzling features of Sartre's early philosophy, and has implications for understanding certain areas of his thought.
Exactly what does Jean-Paul Sartre mean by describing some conscious awareness as 'nonthetic'? He does not explicitly say. Yet this phrase, sprinkled liberally throughout his early philosophical works, is germane to some of the distinctive and fundamental theories of Sartrean existentialism. My aim in this paper is to examine the concept in terms of the role that Sartre claims it plays in bad faith (mauvaise foi), the deliberate and motivated project of refusing to face or consider the consequences of some fact or facts. I will argue that non-thetic awareness could play the role Sartre ascribes to it in bad faith only if it is understood as being equivalent to the nonconceptual representational content currently discussed in anglophone philosophy of mind. I will proceed by first providing an initial rough characterisation of 'nonthetic' awareness through a discussion of the philosophical background to Sartre's term, then showing how this rough characterisation needs to be refined in order that bad faith may evade the two paradoxes of self-deception, next drawing the distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual content, and then arguing that non-thetic awareness must be construed as nonconceptual content. This clarification of one of the most pervasive and one of the most obscure concepts in Sartrean existentialism will have the additional ramifications that Sartre's theory of consciousness in general must be understood as involving both conceptual and nonconceptual structures and that his discussion of the interplay of these structures can provide innovative and valuable contributions to the debates over the role of conceptual and nonconceptual contents in perception and action currently raging in anglophone discussions of mind.
'THETIC' AND 'POSITIONAL'
Sartre's frequent uses of the term 'thetic' (thetique) and its negation without definition is paralleled by his similarly unexplained use of the term 'positional' (positionelle) and its cognates. These two terms, which Sartre seems to consider co-extensive, have been taken over from Edmund Husserl, so Sartre's lack of definitions seems to indicate that he considered himself to be using the stock terminology of the fledgling Phenomenological tradition, stemming from Husserl's work, in which he was keen to situate himself.
The thetic (thetischen) character of an experience, for Husserl, is equivalent to its positional (Setzungs) character (e.g. Ideas, § 129), but Husserl is not consistent on the nature of this character. In Logical Investigations, 'positing' (Setzung) awareness affirms the existence of its object whereas 'nonpositing' awareness suspends judgement about the existence or non-existence of the object (Inv. V § 34). In Ideas, 'positing' is used in a variety of senses, the widest of which encompasses the varieties of mental attitudes towards objects, such that judging, wishing, and perceiving, for example, are different forms of positing ( § 129). And in Cartesian Meditations, 'positing' is defined as 'taking a position as to being', and there are a wide variety of such positions, including 'certainly existing, being possible, being probable, also being beautiful and being good, being useful, etc.' ( § 15). 1 The positional or thetic character of an experience for Husserl, then, is the experience's character of explicitly classifying the experienced object under some category or other, but Husserl is not consistent over the kinds of categories involved. This sense is related to the sense of G. W. F. Hegel's use of the term 'setzen', usually translated as 'to posit', but which means to articulate or make explicit something that was already implicit. 2 Sartre does not use 'positional' in this way. To call a consciousness 'positional', for Sartre, is to say that 'it transcends itself in order to reach an object' (B&N: xxvii). 3 The object posited in an experience is the object singled out, to which I 'direct my attention' (B&N: 95). Looking at a photograph of my friend Peter, for example, I may inspect the shapes and colours on the card, or I may see it as an image of Peter. Only in the former case, according to Sartre, am I seeing the photograph: it is the object posited. In the latter case I am imagining Peter: he is the object posited (PI: 17-8). 4 The positional character of experience, for Sartre, then, is its direction on or towards some particular object, the object posited.
The thetic component of experience in Sartre's theory of consciousness is roughly the aspect of Husserl's notion of the positional character of awareness that is missing from Sartre's notion of positing. Where Sartrean positing is just directedness towards an object, Husserlian positing is directedness towards an object that classifies it in certain ways. The thetic component of an act of consciousness, for Sartre, consists in a thesis or proposition (thèse) classifying the object posited (see B&N: 90); it is the set of ways in which the object is understood. For example:
'In the case of the perception of the chair, there is a thesis -that is, the apprehension and affirmation of the chair as the in-itself which consciousness is not' (B&N: 140).
Perception involves, for Sartre, positing the seen object as present and existing; the thetic component of perception, that is, represents the object posited as present and existing.
Sartre calls the components of the thetic component of awareness 'determinations': determinations are the category headings that the thetic component of a consciousness classifies its object under; they are the way the object is intended. The thetic component of perceptual experience, according to Sartre, ascribes the determinations 'present' and 'existent' to its object. But the thetic character of perceptual experience is by no means restricted to this. There are, for Sartre, two further varieties of determination that can be involved in the thetic component of a perceptual experience.
The first variety track what Sartre calls the 'qualities' of the object. Perceiving a pool, for example, involves awareness of qualities such as '[t]he fluidity, the tepidity, the bluish colour, the undulating restlessness of the water in the pool' (B&N: 186). Each of these qualities of the pool may or may not be referred to in the thetic component of my awareness of the pool. If the pool is seen as fluid, blue, or restless, then these are the determinations ascribed to the pool in my experience. The various qualities of the object are undifferentiated in experience unless the experience contains corresponding determinations (see B&N: 10, 188). Sartre often talks of the thetic component of experience in terms of the 'intentions' of that experience: the determinations are the way in which the object is intended, the way it is presented in intentional experience. Using this terminology, he explains that in any given visual perception there are intentions that are 'motivated' by the seen qualities of the object, and others that are not (B&N: 26-7); some thetic determinations track the object's qualities, others do not.
The second variety of determination is of more interest to Sartre, for determinations of this sort are motivated by the aims and projects of the perceiver. This claim is at the heart of Sartrean existentialism, since it grounds the claim that an individual's project provides the lens through which that individual experiences being in-itself as a world of tools, obstacles, and values. My attempt to realise one of my possibilities is partly responsible for way reality seems to me: 'this projection of myself toward an original possibility … causes the existence of values, appeals, expectations, and in general a world' (B&N: 39); 'perception is in no way to be distinguished from the practical organisation of existents into a world' (B&N: 321). The 'world', for Sartre, is not the mass of being in-itself but the complex of instruments and values that appears to consciousness (B&N: 24, 139, 617-8). Mere chunks of being in-itself are thus experienced as tools or obstacles, as themselves having 'potentialities' in relation to my projects: 'the order of instruments in the world is the image of my possibilities projected into the in-itself; that is, the image of what I am ' (B&N: 292) . This is what Sartre refers to as 'the potentializing structure of perception' (B&N: 197): the fact that being in-itself is perceived as a world of tools, obstacles, and values relating to my projects (see also B&N: 199) . And this relation between projects and the experienced structure of the world is captured in the key existentialist term 'situation'. Sartre introduces this term in his discussion of the project of looking through a keyhole to observe a scene, claiming that 'there is a spectacle to be seen behind the door only because I am jealous, but my jealousy is nothing except the simple objective fact that there is a sight to be seen behind the door' (B&N: 259). Being jealous and experiencing being in-itself as structured in this way are one and the same. This 'situation' is the combination of facts about the environment, such as the existence of a door with a keyhole, with facts about my aims and projects, such as my wish to see the scene beyond the door: a situation always involves determinations imposed by the projects of the situated individual as well as those that track the qualities of the individual's immediate environment.
The thetic component of experience, and the two varieties of determination it involves, is what Sartre is alluding to when he describes focusing on an object as making it 'the object of a detailed attention' (B&N: 95). The term translated as 'detailed' is 'circonstanciée', which implies appropriateness to the circumstances. Both varieties of determination are ideally appropriate to the circumstances, but can fail to be. The determination 'clear' is appropriate to a glass of water in that it refers to a manifest quality of the object, but if I am thirsty the determination 'inviting' is also appropriate to the object in a way that it would not be if the glass was empty. So when Sartre talks of only the first sort of determinations being 'motivated' by the qualities of the object (B&N: 27), he is best understood as claiming that only the first sort are motivated purely by the qualities of the object: the second sort are motivated by qualities plus the seer's aims and projects. Sartre uses the terms 'positional' and 'thetic' co-extensively, then, not simply because the two aspects of experience that they pick out are conflated by Hegel and Husserl under the concept of positing. More importantly, it is because the thetic character of an experience is the characterisation of the object singled out, and the positional character is the singling out of the object: the thetic character refers to whatever is posited, and so is not independent of the positional character.
BAD FAITH AND THE PARADOXES OF SELF-DECEPTION
Bad faith, in Sartre's philosophy, is the deliberate and motivated project of concealing some unpleasant truth from oneself. It is not simply a mistake, but a form of self-deception. And herein lies a theoretical problem: the idea of deceiving oneself seems to generate two logical paradoxes, as Sartre is aware (B&N: 43, 47-54). Sartre employs his notion of non-thetic awareness to provide a non-paradoxical account of bad faith. Before going on to show that non-thetic awareness can play this role only if it is understood as the nonconceptual content currently discussed by anglophone philosophers, I will explain the paradoxes of selfdeception in order to clarify the role of non-thetic awareness in bad faith.
The two paradoxes of self-deception arise from the fact that deception is not an honest mistake: the deceiver deliberately inculcates in the deceived a false belief. The first paradox of self-deception concerns the self-deceiver's awareness of the unpleasant fact to be concealed. In ordinary deception, the deceiver must be aware of the truth to be hidden from the deceived, but the deceiver cannot aware of this truth if the deception is to succeed. So the self-deceiver, it seems, must both be aware of the truth and not be aware of the truth, which seems to be a contradiction. The second arises from the self-deceiver's awareness of the intention to deceive: the deceiver must be aware of this for the deception to be deliberate, but the deceived must not be aware of it if the deception is to succeed. So the self-deceiver, it seems, must both be aware of the intent to self-deceive and not be aware of the intent to self-deceive, which seems to be a contradiction. If Jeffrey Archer tries to deceive us over his dealings with prostitutes, then he must be aware of the truth about his dealings with prostitutes and be aware of his intention to deceive. If his deception is to succeed, we must not be aware of either of these things. But if he is to deceive himself, then he needs to be both aware and unaware of the truth and both aware and unaware of his intention, which seems to involve two contradictions.
Some philosophers point out that the paradoxes arise only if self-deception is thought of as a state in which the self-deceiver must believe and not believe the same things at the same time. If self-deception is instead thought of as a process or a scattered event, the thought runs, then successful self-deception involves forgetting the truth and the intention to deceive by the time the new belief is in place. 5 Jeffrey could happily deceive himself, so long as he forgot about the prostitutes and about his intention to deceive. This suggestion, however, will not do for Sartre's purposes. Sartre is concerned with cases in which the evidence against the self-induced belief is continuous or at least frequent, yet the self-deceiver persists in holding that belief. The anguish that continually reveals our freedom and responsibility, for example, does not prevent people from deceiving themselves into believing that they are not free and responsible (see B&N: 43). In such cases, the self-deceiver must continue to intend to hide the truth. 'When reality (or memory) continues to threaten the self-induced belief of the selfdeceived, continuing motivation is necessary to keep the happy thought in place.' 6 In order to maintain the claim that one can be continually motivated to deceive oneself, we must distinguish two senses in which one can be aware of the truth and of one's intention, so that the paradoxes can be resolved by the claim that the self-deceiver is aware of these things in one sense, and unaware of them in another. The mind could be divided, for example, between conscious and unconscious mental activity, which would allow Jeffrey to deceive himself by allowing him unconscious awareness of his dealings with prostitutes and his intention to deceive, but no conscious awareness of these things. Sartre, however, wishes to retain the unity and integrity of the conscious subject, and thinks that the distinction between conscious and unconscious fails to maintain this unity, but also that it fails for other reasons (see B&N: 47-54).
Instead of distinguishing conscious from unconscious mental activity, Sartre distinguishes thetic from non-thetic awareness, allowing Jeffrey to deceive himself so long as he has non-thetic awareness of his dealings with prostitutes and his intention to deceive, but no thetic awareness of it. We will see later on that this distinction is not so different from Freud's distinction between conscious and unconscious mental activity as Sartre seems to think. But first I will argue that Sartre's distinction should be construed as the distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual representational content.
REPRESENTATIONS AND CONCEPTS
It may seem odd to claim that Sartre's distinction between thetic and non-thetic should be construed as a distinction between two types of representational content, given that Sartre declared that '[r]epresentations … are idols invented by the psychologists' (B&N: 125), and that:
'All consciousness … is consciousness of something. This means that there is no consciousness that is not a positing of a transcendent object, or, if you prefer, that consciousness has no "content" … A table is not in consciousness -not even in the capacity of a representation. A table is in space, beside the window, etc.' (B&N: xxvii)
The term 'representational content', however, no longer has the meaning in philosophical parlance that it did when Sartre wrote Being and Nothingness. Sartre is opposed to any theory of mind that holds us to be aware only of private images that represent the real world beyond. 7 When Sartre writes disparagingly of 'representations' and 'contents', he means purported private, subjective objects of awareness, which have been variously dubbed ideas, impressions, sensa, sensations (see B&N: 314-5), sense data, and percepts. But philosophers who deny the existence of such entities continue to talk of conscious events representing aspects of the world, and distinguish this from the claim that conscious events involve awareness of the representation. Rather, current anglophone 'intentionalist' theorists argue, to be in a mental state that represents a certain object is to be aware of that object, not to be aware of the representation. 8 This is not to say that Sartre's theory of the intentionality of consciousness is to be understood in terms of the current anglophone notion of intentionality, merely to point out that Sartre's statements opposing the notions of mental representation and mental content do not preclude describing his position in terms of those notions as they are employed in current anglophone philosophy: the terms have shifted meanings since Sartre used them. To say that a mental state or event has representational content, these days, is just to say that it picks out an object or state of affairs and presents it in some way or other. You might believe that the cat is on the mat, in which case your belief represents the cat being on the mat. This does not require awareness of a representation of a cat and a mat. It is quite clear that Sartre believes consciousness to classify its objects, as cat and mat for example, rather than simply present their bare sensuous properties like colour and shape (see ''Thetic' and 'Positional'', above), and this classification is part of representation.
Anglophone philosophers distinguish two kinds of representational content: those that are composed of concepts and those that are not. A concept is an inferentially relevant constituent of a representation, and possessing a concept consists in having a set of inferentially related representations with a common constituent. Possessing the concept 'cat', for example, consists in possessing a set of inferentially related representations concerned with cats, such as the beliefs that cats are domestic pets, are tame, and are smaller than houses. A representation is conceptual, then, only if it is composed of concepts, which means that it stands in inferential relations to a set of other representations possessed by the same organism. A nonconceptual representation, on the other hand, does not stand in inferential relations. It can be possessed by an organism that does not possess the concepts required to express that representation. 9 A nonconceptual representation is a representation: it specifies a possible state of affairs. But it is independent of what Wilfrid Sellars called 'the logical space of reasons': it cannot be inferred from other mental representations, other mental representations cannot be inferred from it, and it cannot be linguistically articulated, say in response to a question. 10 An intention, for example, would consist in a nonconceptual representation if it consisted in a state of the brain or mind that specified a possible future state of affairs as something to be aimed for, but was independent of the logical space of reasons.
I am going to argue that Sartre's distinction between thetic and non-thetic awareness should be understood as a distinction not between representational and non-representational forms of awareness, but between conceptual and non-conceptual representational awareness if it is to play the role in bad faith that Sartre ascribes to it.
NON-THETIC AWARENESS AS NONCONCEPTUAL CONTENT
Bad faith, as we have seen, is a form of self-deception, and so seems to require awareness of the unpleasant fact to be hidden and of the intention to deceive along with simultaneous lack of awareness of these things. Sartre attempts to avert these paradoxes without distinguishing conscious from unconscious awareness by distinguishing thetic from non-thetic awareness: the self-deceiver has non-thetic awareness of the awful truth and of the intention to deceive, but has no thetic awareness of these things.
It is clear, then, that non-thetic awareness must be a form of representational awareness: unless the awful truth is classified as unpleasant, then its unpleasantness cannot motivate the self-deception, and unless the intention is classified as an intention to deceive, then the intention cannot be acted on. The aversion to the truth and the carrying out of the intention cannot be explained by an awareness of the truth and intention that does not classify them, for such awareness would not be distinguishable from awareness of a pleasant truth and an intention to be honest.
But this non-thetic awareness must also be nonconceptual, for otherwise it would stand in rational relations to other conceptual representations had by the self-deceiver. In particular, the self-deceiver would not be capable of believing the opposite of the awful truth while having conceptual representations of the truth of the awful truth and of the intention to self-deceive: the contradiction would simply be obvious. But only conceptual representations are inferentially and rationally linked to one another (that is what makes them conceptual representations), so only conceptual representations can contradict or be contradicted. If nonthetic awareness is understood as involving nonconceptual content, then it will not stand in inferential or rational relations to explicit and articulable beliefs and so cannot threaten the subject's cognitive ignorance of the thing to be avoided or cognitive assent to the happy thought.
This distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual content can help to resolve a seeming contradiction in Sartre's account of non-thetic awareness of one's current activities. He claims that when engaged in a project such as counting cigarettes, non-thetic consciousness allows one to answer the question 'what are you doing?', yet he also claims that 'children who are capable of making an addition spontaneously cannot explain subsequently how they set about it' (B&N: xxix). Why is it that non-thetic awareness allows one to report current activities but not how they are carried out? If non-thetic awareness is understood as involving nonconceptual content, then this seeming contradiction can be resolved. The awareness does not stand in the space of reasons, so one cannot form linguistically articulable beliefs on the basis of it: it allows one to be aware of what one is doing without being able to explain how it is happening. But also, nonconceptual awareness may be responsible for an action feeling appropriate or inappropriate to a conceptually formed intention: if I conceptually intend to count cigarettes, then proceed to do so, the non-thetic awareness of my activity may be an awareness of the appropriateness of my activity given the initial intention.
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If the initial intention is not itself conceptually structured, of course, then no linguistically articulable belief about it can be formed. This is what I take Sartre to mean by describing consciousness as 'translucent' (translucide) as opposed to 'transparent' (transparent). The difference between transparency and translucency is best illustrated by the difference between an ordinary window and one made of frosted glass; as Larousse puts it, a translucide body diffuses light so that objects 'are not clearly visible' (ne sont pas visible avec netteté) through it.
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For consciousness to be translucent, then, is for there to be some awareness of one's own consciousness but this not structured in the right way to allow the formation of articulable beliefs about that consciousness.
This reading of Sartre also clears him of the charge that he 'unjustifiably ignores a number of different forms of knowledge', concentrating too narrowly on conceptual or propositional knowledge and overlooking such forms of knowledge as the unarticulable knowhow required for successful action. 13 When Sartre talks of knowledge revealing truths to us 'with an orientation in relation to other truths, to certain consequences' (B&N: 155), he can be understood as describing conceptually structured knowledge, the kind of knowledge displayed in response to questions. Know-how, on the other hand, should be understood as involving nonconceptual content. Sartre's limitation of the scope of 'knowledge' to the conceptual realm can then be seen simply as stipulating a use of the term, rather than denying the existence of know-how. 14 If I am right that non-thetic awareness should be understood as involving nonconceptual content, then Sartre's theory of mind is much closer to Sigmund Freud's than Sartre seems to have understood: the Freudian unconscious consists of representations that are not rationally related either to each other or to conscious, cognitive beliefs about reality, and are thereby nonconceptual. This is why they are not easily reportable or captured in rational thought. But there is more to the Freudian unconscious than its nonconceptual structure. Freud thought that the representations in the unconscious were charged with 'cathectic energy', which drove them to attempt to find expression in clear consciousness. 15 This theory of cathectic energy, the theory of 'blind forces' that Sartre is opposed to (B&N: 52), however, is not entailed by the theory of nonconceptual content, and so can be consistently rejected by Sartre.
CONCLUSIONS
Self-deception is a seemingly paradoxical notion, as it seems to require awareness of a truth to be concealed and of the intent to conceal it whilst also requiring ignorance of these things. Since Sartre's bad faith is a form of self-deception, his account of the structures of bad faith needs to show how this is possible. I have argued that Sartre's account can succeed only if non-thetic awareness is understood as involving nonconceptual content: the undesirable fact is classified as undesirable and the intention to conceal it is classified as an intention to conceal it, but these classifications are not structured in such a way that articulable beliefs can be inferred from them or in such a way as to stand in the rational relation of contradiction to the pleasing belief the self-deceiver engenders.
This construal of Sartre's distinction between thetic and non-thetic awareness draws out the need to understand his theory of consciousness in terms of both conceptual and nonconceptual aspects. Sartre's 'conscious' cannot be equated with 'conceptual', even though Freud's use of 'conscious' can. Moreover, this construal of non-thetic consciousness does not conflict with Yiwei Zheng's innovative account of Sartre's notion of non-positional awareness as a feel that feels to be what it is, as opposed to a positional consciousness that reveals something other than itself. My claim is simply that such a feel, if Zheng is right about this, must involve nonconceptual representation if it is to play the role Sartre wants it to play in bad faith. 16 My account of Sartre's distinction between thetic and non-thetic awareness in terms of the distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual content also has ramifications for the use of Sartre's work as a resource in current debates in anglophone philosophy of mind: Sartre's use of the notion of non-thetic awareness in the motivation of bad faith marks out a distinctive contribution to the theory of action as well as providing an innovative dissolution of the paradoxes of self-deception. There may also be potential contributions to anglophone epistemology and the philosophy of perception to be made through disentangling Sartre's dense discussion of the relation between 'determinations' and 'qualities' in perception, and his theory of the formation of determinations, in the light of this distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual content (see B&N: 186-204). 
